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fining rights in individual and aggregate terms73 to the practical cri- 
tique that the Court's "messianic delusions about its ability to perfect 
the process through judicial intercession" will hamstring legislatures 
attempting to redraw boundaries following the 2000 census74 - the 
virtue of the Court's jurisprudence lay in its willingness to delve can- 
didly into the role that race should play in politics. Indeed, the distinc- 
tion previously traced by the Court between political intent and pre- 
dominant racial intent, while marred by the thorny practical problem 
of proving intent, offers an unambiguous normative view of how race 
and politics should intersect. By contrast, the Cromartie 11 Court 
seems to have radically reduced the scrutiny applied to legislative dis- 
tricting decisions without offering one whit of discussion of why such a 
change is preferable. 
Since the Court disregarded Justice Frankfurter's aversion to the 
"political thicket"75 by hearing an apportionment challenge in Baker v. 
Carr,76 the judiciary has acted as the central forum for exploring and 
resolving questions about the democratic pr0cess.7~ Every pro- 
nouncement that the Court makes in this role evinces a particular un- 
derstanding of how democracy should work.?= Against this backdrop, 
Cromartie ZI's bow to formalism - effectively jettisoning the debate 
over the proper role race should play in the redistricting process by 
rendering Shaw 11 inapplicable whenever two empty conditions are 
satisfied - is most objectionable. If a majority of the Court wishes to 
overturn Shaw 11, it should do so explicitly. 
E. Establishment Clause 
Religious Speech. - After the Supreme Court held in Widmar v. 
Vincent1 that state universities could not constitutionally deny religious 
73 See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 6. 
74 Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Nezt Time: Reapportionment After the zooo Census, 50 STAN. 
L. REV. 731, 763 (1998). 
75 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). 
76 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962). 
77 Whether the Court lacks institutional competence in this arena is a separate question. Jus- 
tice Thomas offered perhaps the seminal exposition of the argument that the Court should extri- 
cate itself from the thicket in his concurrence in Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 891 (1994). See id. 
at 901-02 (iL[A]n infinite number of theories of effective suffrage, representation, and the proper 
apportionment of political power in a representative democracy . . . could be drawn upon to [de- 
fine how democracy should work]. . . . [Sluch matters of political theory are beyond the ordinary 
sphere of federal judges. And that is precisely the point." (citations omitted)). 
78 Cf: Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Comment: [Elracing Democracy: The 
Voting Rights Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 109, 121-23 (1994) (arguing that Justice Thomas's decla- 
ration in Holder that he wished to limit federal intervention in local elections to avoid choosing 
between competing political theories itself "rests on a particular political theoryI:] that political 
equality is satisfied by the simple condition of universal suffrage"). 
454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
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groups access to facilities generally available to student g r o ~ p s , ~  a 
number of school districts authored access policies that were designed 
to create "limited public for urn^."^ These policies delineated the cate- 
gories of activities for which school property could be used, and indi- 
cated that religious activities were not among them.4 In Lamb's Chapel 
v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,S however, the Supreme 
Court struck a blow to the notion that school districts could employ 
the limited public forum approach to exclude religious activities from 
their facilities. There, a unanimous Court held that once a school dis- 
trict had allowed access to its facilities for discussions relating to 
family issues and child rearing, its exclusion of a group seeking to 
discuss such issues from a religious standpoint violated that group's 
free speech rights.6 Last Term, in Good News Club v. Milford Central 
School,' the Court went further, holding that once a school has opened 
its doors to activities relating to character development, even the pro- 
hibition of activities that involve religious instruction amounts to 
viewpoint discriminati~n.~ The Court's Good News decision indicates 
that the limited public forum doctrine has essentially run its course as 
a rationale for a school's exclusion of religious activities from its facili- 
ties, and demonstrates the need for a more fact-intensive, context- 
specific endorsement test to determine when the Establishment Clause 
justifies such exclusions. 
In 1992, the Milford Central School District (Milford) adopted a 
"Community Use Policy" governing the usage of its school facilities by 
district residents.9 This policy, adopted pursuant to section 414 of the 
New York Education Law,1° stated that district residents could use the 
Milford school building for social, civic, and recreational meetings, en- 
' See id. a t  277. 
When the state establishes a limited public forum, in contrast to a traditional or open public 
forum, it may exclude speech from that forum as long as that restriction is reasonable and view- 
point neutral. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). 
See, e.g., Gregoire v. Centennial Sch. Dist., go7 F.zd 1366, 1369 (3d Cir. rggo) (stating that in 
1988, defendant school district had adopted guidelines that granted access only "to those organiza- 
tions, groups, and activities which are compatible with the mission and function of the school sys- 
tem" and prohibited the use of school facilities for religious services or the distribution of religious 
literature); Wallace v. Washoe County Sch. Dist., 818 E Supp. 1346, 1350 (D. Nev. 1991) (stating 
that from 1982 to 1986, defendant school district had adopted a policy whereby "[~Jommunity 
groups shall be permitted and encouraged to use school facilities for worthwhile purposes pro- 
vided that . . . the use thereof is not for a religious purpose" (alteration in original) (quoting 
Washoe County School District Administrative Regulation 1330) (internal quotation marks omit- 
ted)). 
508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
Id. a t  396-97. 
' 1 2 1  S. Ct. 2093 (2001). 
~ d .  a t  2101,2107. 
Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 2 0 2  Egd 502,504 ( ~ d  Cir. 2000). 
'O N.Y. EDUC. LAW 5 414 (McKinney 2000). 
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tertainment events, and other uses relating to the welfare of the com- 
munity, as long as such uses were nonexclusive and open to the general 
public.ll The policy further stated that "school premises shall not be 
used by any individual or organization for religious purposes."12 
On September 2 2 ,  1996, the organizers and instructors of the Good 
News Club (Club), an organization overseen and supported by the 
Child Evangelism Fellowship, formally requested permission to use 
the Milford school cafeteria from 3:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. to hold its 
weekly meetings.ls These meetings are attended by children ranging 
in age from six to twelve,14 and consist of an opening prayer, the sing- 
ing of Christian songs, the recital of biblical verses, a discussion of a 
Bible reading, and a closing prayer.ls During each meeting, the in- 
structor "challenges" the "saved" children to "[sltop and ask God for 
the strength and the want .  . . to obey Him," while encouraging 
"unsaved" children to accept Jesus as their savior.16 
The Milford superintendent denied the Club's application.17 The 
Club, Darleen Fournier (a Club instructor), and her seven-year-old 
daughter Andrea Fournier filed suit in the Northern District of New 
York under both 42 U.S.C. 1983 (for violations of their free speech 
and equal protection rights) and the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act of 1993 (RFRA).18 They successfully moved for a preliminary in- 
junction against Milford's ban.Ig The district court, however, vacated 
the injunction and granted Milford's motion for summary judgment.20 
Noting the parties' stipulation that Milford was operating a limited 
public forum,21 the court stated that the crucial question was whether 
the Club's meetings fell within the scope of activities allowed in that 
forum.Z2 The court concluded that they did not, finding that the Club 
" Good News,  zoz F.3d at 504. 
l2 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 21 F. Supp. 2d 147,150 (N.D.N.Y. 1998). 
l3 ~ d .  at 149. 
l4 Good News,  2 0 2  F.3d at 504. 
Is  Good News, 21 E. Supp. zd at 154. 
l6 Id. at 156 (alterations in original) (quoting Def. Ex. 8) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
l7 The superintendent explained that he viewed the Club's proposed activities as "the equiva- 
lent of religious worship, . . . rather than the expression of religious views or values on a secular 
subject." Id. at 152 (alteration in original) (quoting Letter from Robert McGruder, Interim Super- 
intendent, Milford School District (October 3, 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In mak- 
ing this statement, the superintendent was distinguishing the Club's activities from the type of 
activity at  issue in Lamb's Chapel. See id.  
l8 Id. at 150. 
l9 Id. 
20 Id. at 161. 
21 ~ d .  at 153. 
2 2  See id.  a t  154.   he court did not consider the plaintiffs' RFRA claim, because the Supreme 
Court had already declared RFRA unconstitutional. Id .  a t  150 n.4. 
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was not simply offering a religious perspective on a secular subject 
matter, but dealing directly with a religious subject mattersz3 
The Second Circuit affirmed.24 Writing for the majority, Judge 
Minerz5 found that the Club was "doing something other than simply 
teaching moral values . . . . [It was] focused on teaching children how 
to cultivate their relationship with God through Jesus Christ."26 The 
court also appealed to Second Circuit precedent upholding the consti- 
tutionality of school districts' exclusions of groups engaging in reli- 
gious worship and instr~ction.~'  Judge Jacobs dissented, arguing that 
the Club's speech could be characterized as "the teach[ing of] morals 
from a religious perspective," and that under Lamb's Chapel, Milford's 
exclusion of the Club amounted to viewpoint d i s~ r imina t ion .~~  
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded.29 Writing for the ma- 
jority, Justice Thomas30 stated that the case presented two questions: 
whether Milford had violated the Club's free speech rights when it de- 
nied the Club access, and whether the Establishment Clause justified 
such a violation.31 He argued that it was "quite clear that Milford en- 
gaged in viewpoint discrimination."J2 He explained .that Milford had 
opened its limited public forum to any group that "promote[s] the 
moral and character development of the children."33 He rejected the 
notion that the Club's activities constituted "mere religious worship, 
divorced from any teaching of moral values,"34 finding instead that the 
Club was "teach[ing] moral lessons from a Christian perspective 
through live storytelling and prayer."35 Accordingly, this case was 
"materially indistinguishable" from Lamb's 
23 Id. a t  160. 
2 4  Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202  F.gd 502, 511 (2d Cir. 2000). 
25 Judge Parker joined Judge Miner's opinion. 
26 Good News, 2 0 2  F.3d at 510. 
2 7  See id. (referring to Bronx Household of Faith v. Community School District No. 10, 1 2 7  
F.jd 2 0 7  (zd Cir. 1997)~ and Full Gospel Tabemc le  v. Community School District 27, 979 E Supp. 
214 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), affd ,  164 F.3d 829 (zd Cir. 1999)). 
Id. at 51s (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Good News, 202 F.3d at 
508) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
29 Good News, 1 2 1  S. Ct. at  2107. 
30 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy joined Justice Tho- 
mas. Justice Breyer joined Justice Thomas in part. 
31 Good News, 1 2 1  S .  Ct. at  2107. 
32 Id. at 2101. 
33 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for Appellee at  6, Good News, 2 0 2  F.3d 502 (2000) 
(No. 98-9494)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
34 Id. at 2103 n.4. 
35 Id. at 2101. 
36 Id. at 2103 n.4. Similarly, Justice Thomas argued that the Court's holding in Rosenberger 
v. Rector of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995), dictated a finding in favor of the 
Club. Good News, 1 2 1  S. Ct. at  2 1 0 2 .  In Rosenberger, the Court held that a state university's 
denial of funding to a club whose publication contained a Christian viewpoint was unconstitu- 
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Justice Thomas then rejected Milford's contention that the Club's 
presence would violate the Establishment Clause.37 He noted that the 
Club was seeking "nothing more than to be treated neutrally and given 
access to speak about the same topics as are other He then 
attacked the notion that the Club's presence among elementary school 
students posed a special risk of coercion, given that the parents would 
decide whether their children attended Club meetings.39 Finally, he 
moved to the endorsement inquiry. He questioned whether the stu- 
dents would likely misperceive school endorsement of the Club's ac- 
tivities, given that the Club meetings differed in appearance from ele- 
mentary school classes.40 He reasoned that even if some students 
were to misperceive endorsement, "we cannot say [that this] danger 
. . . is any greater than the danger that they would perceive a hostility 
toward the religious viewpoint if the Club were excluded from the 
public forum."41 He concluded that the Court should not enforce a 
"modified heckler's veto," whereby a religious activity could be prohib- 
ited merely "on the basis of what the youngest members of the audi- 
ence might misperceive."4* 
Justice Scalia concurred. Agreeing that Milford had committed 
viewpoint discrimination, he disagreed that the Club's inclusion of 
"purely religious" speech transformed its meetings into "something dif- 
ferent in kind from other, nonreligious activities that teach moral and 
character development."43 He noted the Court's inability to agree on 
which category of religious speech the Club's activities fell into, argu- 
ing that such distinctions lack content and admini~trabi l i ty .~~ Justice 
Scalia also rejected Milford's Establishment Clause argument, stating 
that the Club's presence posed no risk of coercion or e n d o r ~ e m e n t . ~ ~  
Justice Breyer concurred and joined in part of the Court's opinion. 
He stated that the Court's reversal of summary judgment should mean 
only that "viewing the disputed facts (including facts about the chil- 
tional viewpoint discrimination, in light of the university's practice of making funds generally 
available for extracurricular activities. Rosenberger, 51s U.S. at 828-37. 
37 Good News, 121 S .  Ct. at 2103. As a preliminary matter, Justice Thomas noted that al- 
though the Court had previously determined that a state interest in avoiding an Establishment 
Clause violation could justify content-based discrimination, the Court had yet to rule on whether 
such an interest could also justify viewpoint-based discrimination. He explained, however, that 
since Milford had "no valid Establishment Clause interestn in the first place, the Court did not 
need to reach that issue. Id. 
38 Id. at 2104. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 2 106. 
4 l  Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 2 109 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
44 Id. at 2110-11. 
4s ~ d .  at 2 107-08. 
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dren's perceptions) favorably to the Club (the nonmoving party), the 
school has not shown an Establishment Clause ~ i o l a t i o n . " ~ ~  Justice 
Breyer argued that Milford still might be able to set forth evidence in- 
dicating an Establishment Clause violation, given the Court's previous 
statements regarding the importance of children's perceptions. The 
critical question, he reasoned, might well be "whether a child, partici- 
pating in the Good News Club's activities, could reasonably perceive 
the school's permission for the [Cllub to use its facilities as an en- 
dorsement of religi~n."~' He thus suggested that the Court should only 
have reversed Milford's summary judgment victory, rather than effec- 
tively granting summary judgment to the 
Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that Milford had not committed 
viewpoint discrimination by denying access to the He stated 
that speech for "religious purposes" encompasses three different cate- 
gories: speech that addresses a particular topic from a religious point 
of view (as in Lamb's Chapel); speech that is the equivalent of religious 
worship; and speech "that is aimed principally a t  proselytizing or in- 
culcating belief in a particular religious faith."50 This case, he ex- 
plained, presented the question whether a school district could create a 
limited public forum allowing the Lamb's Chapel type of religious 
speech, but excluding the latter two categories, without committing 
viewpoint d i sc r imina t i~n .~~ Arguing that such action should be per- 
missible, he stated that a significant difference exists between Lamb's 
Chapel-type speech and religious proselytizing, just as a significant dif- 
ference exists between meetings to discuss political issues and meetings 
"whose principal purpose is to recruit new members to join a political 
o rganiza t i~n ."~~ He concluded that the Club's activities constituted 
proselytizing, and thus fell outside of Milford's limited public forum.j3 
Justice Souter also dissented.j4 First, he stated that Milford had 
not engaged in viewpoint discrimination. He discussed a t  length the 
Club's typical meetings, and concluded that they constituted an "evan- 
gelical service of worship," rather than the discussion of a subject from 
a Christian point of view.55 He suggested that the majority's "bland 
and general characterization of Good News's activity as 'teaching of 
46 Id. at 2 I 12 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
47 ~ d .  at 2111. 
48 Id. at 2112. 
49 See id. at 2 1 1 4  (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
~ d .  at 2112. 
See id. at 2113. 
52 Id.  
53 See id. at 2114. Justice Stevens also criticized the majority's decision to "reach out" and 
decide the Establishment Clause issue. Id. at 2114-15. 
54 Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Souter's dissent. 
55 Id. at 2 117 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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morals and character, from a religious standpoint"' indicated that it 
was "ignor[ingJ reality"; otherwise, "this case would stand for the re- 
markable proposition that any public school opened for civic meetings 
must be opened for use as a church, synagogue, or mosque."56 Justice 
Souter then criticized the majority for not remanding the Establish- 
ment Clause issue,57 and indicated his disagreement with the merits of 
the majority's Establishment Clause analysis. In his view, the "par- 
ticular impressionability" of elementary schoolchildren, as well as the 
timing and format of the Club's meetings, suggested that the Club's 
presence might prompt children to perceive e n d o r ~ e m e n t . ~ ~  
When Widmar was first decided, its emphasis on the state univer- 
sity's "open access" policy59 seemed to leave room for the possibility 
that school districts could render Widmar inapplicable by narrowly de- 
fining the boundaries of their access policies.60 The Court's Lamb's 
Chapel and Good News decisions, however, have illustrated the diffi- 
culties of using the limited public forum doctrine as a basis for exclud- 
ing religious activities from schools with community access policies. 
Good News makes clear that once a school district has adopted an  ac- 
cess policy permitting any sort of activity related to character devel- 
opment, religious clubs need only frame their activities in such terms 
to fall within the district's limited public forum. Moreover, even ac- 
tivities consisting of straightforward religious worship would seem to 
fall within the scope of such limited forums, as long as their organizers 
can assert that the meetings relate to the teaching of moral values - 
an entirely predictable and reasonable claim. The majority noted that 
"the Club's activities do not constitute mere religious worship, di- 
vorced from any teaching of moral values,"61 but given the moral over- 
tones often present in worship, it is unlikely that many instances of re- 
ligious worship would meet 'this definition. Within the realm of the 
limited public forum doctrine, then, the "proposition that any public 
school opened for civic meetings must be opened for use as a church, 
synagogue, or mosque" seems quite ~ n r e m a r k a b l e . ~ ~  If the criterion 
56 Id. (quoting Good News, 1 2 1  S .  Ct. at  2101). 
57 Id. 
Id. at 2118-20. 
59 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-70 (1981) (stating that because the state university 
'<had created a forum generally open for use by student groups," any content-based exclusions 
must satisfy strict scrutiny). 
60 See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-48 (1983) (stating that 
the open character of the university's forum in Widmar rendered it "bound by the same standards 
as apply in a traditional public forum," but that when a limited public forum has been created, 
"the constitutional right of access would . . . extend only to other entities of similar character"). 
61 Good News, 12 I S. Ct. at  2 103 n.4. 
62 See id. a t  2117 (Souter, J., dissenting). Indeed, Widmar itself suggested that judges neither 
can nor should distinguish between worship and other forms of religious speech. See Widmar, 
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for entry is a relationship between the speech and character develop- 
ment, religious worship should be on the same footing as Bible clubs 
and other types of religious activities. 
The nature of the religious speech at issue does, however, remain 
relevant to an Establishment Clause analysis, the second line of in- 
quiry invoked in Good News. Indeed, in the wake of the Court's Good 
News ruling, the only remaining rationale for excluding any religious 
activities from school districts with community access policies such as 
Milford's - aside from activities that explicitly dissociate themselves 
from the teaching of moral values - is the potential of those activities 
to violate the Establishment Clause. This shift toward the Establish- 
ment Clause makes sense. The limited public forum doctrine rests on 
the ability to categorize various types of speech, a profoundly difficult 
inquiry in the context of religion. Indeed, forcing judges to place reli- 
gious speech into predetermined categories, such as "religious perspec- 
tives on secular topics" and "religious instruction," requires them to act 
as theologians, engaging in abstract inquiries into the very nature of 
religion itself.63 The Establishment Clause inquiry, by contrast, looks 
a t  each instance of religious speech on its own terms, thus providing a 
more effective analytical method for assessing which religious activi- 
ties should be excluded from school facilities. 
There is no denying, however, that the Establishment Clause in- 
quiry is laden with its own complexities - in particular, the challenge 
of selecting and defining the appropriate standard for a violation. In 
its five opinions, the Good News Court invoked the endorsement test,64 
the neutrality test,65 and the coercion test66 in assessing whether the 
Club's presence violated the Establishment Clause. The endorsement 
test emerged as the dominant test, with the majority, Justice Breyer, 
and Justice Souter all devoting the bulk of their Establishment Clause 
454 U.S. at  269 n.6 (stating that distinctions between religious worship and other types of religious 
speech lack content, administrability, and relevance). 
63 See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 2 0 2  F.3d 502,512 (zd Cir. 2000) (Jacobs, J., 
dissenting) (stating that "when the subject matter is morals and character, it is quixotic to attempt 
a distinction between religious viewpoints and religious subject matters"); id. a t  515 (noting that 
whether morality is "a subject that is secular by naturen is dependent "on one's point of view"); 
Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 127 F.3d 207, 221  (2d Cir. 1997) (Cabranes, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (expressing skepticism of "the government's ability to 
draw distinctions between religious worship - or indeed religious instruction - and other forms 
of speech from a religious viewpoint that District # 10 has elected to allow," because "the very act 
of making such classifications may deeply - and unconstitutionally - entangle public officials in 
essentially theological determinations"). 
64 Good News, 1 2 1  S. Ct. a t  2104-06; id .  a t  2107-08 (Scalia, J., concurring); id .  a t  2111-12 
(Breyer, J., concurring in part); id .  at 2 I 18-20 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
6s Good News, 12 I S. Ct. at  2 104. 
66 ~ d .  at 2 107 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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discussions to this inquiry. The majority's application of the endorse- 
ment test, however, lacked the appropriate level of vigor. 
As previously articulated by Justice O'Connor, the endorsement 
test has two key components. First, it is equally sensitive to govern- 
ment actions that would make either religious nonadherents or adher- 
ents feel isolated from the larger political c ~ m m u n i t y . ~ ~  Second, in 
measuring whether messages of endorsement or disapproval of religion 
are being sent, it does not focus on the actual impressions of individual 
community members. Rather, it focuses on the perception of a hypo- 
thetical "reasonable obser~er"6~ in that community, to create a "collec- 
tive standard to gauge the objective meaning of the [government's] 
statement in the ~ o m m u n i t y . " ~ ~  The endorsement test thus includes 
both objective and subjective elements: it is objective insofar as it does 
not focus on the impressions of specific individuals and subjective in 
that perception is the standard for Establishment Clause violations. 
The majority's conclusory application of the endorsement test dis- 
torted both of these elements. It attempted a fact-specific inquiry into 
whether the Club's presence would lead Milford students to form an 
impression of endorsement, only to abandon that inquiry a mere para- 
graph later.70 Justice Thomas explained that "we cannot say the dan- 
ger that children would misperceive the endorsement of religion is any 
greater than the danger that they would perceive a hostility toward the 
religious viewpoint if the Club were excluded from the public forum," 
and then promptly resolved the issue to avoid the latter danger.71 
Given that the endorsement test values both types of perceptions 
equally, the Court should have remanded the case for further factfind- 
ing on this issue. Instead, the Court found that the endorsement test 
favored the Club through two questionable moves. 
First, in describing the adherent's impression of hostility as a "per- 
ception" and the nonadherent's impression of religious endorsement as 
a "mispercept i~n ,"~~ the Court implied that the latter was less legiti- 
67 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,688 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the Estab- 
lishment Clause is infringed by "government endorsement or disapproval of religion. Endorse- 
ment sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political 
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members 
of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message"). 
68 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
69 Id. at 779 (alteration in original) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. a t  690 (O'Connor, J., concurring)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
70 Good News, I 2 I S. Ct. a t  2 106. 
7 l  Id. 
72 Id. (stating that "even if we were to inquire into the minds of schoolchildren in this case, we 
cannot say the danger that children would misperceive the endorsement of religion is any greater 
than the danger that they would perceive a hostility toward the religious viewpoint if the Club 
were excluded from the public forum," and that ''[wle decline to employ Establishment Clause 
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mate than the former. This divergence in wording assumed its conclu- 
sion. Although the Court had already found that the exclusion of the 
Club constituted viewpoint discrimination, such that it would have 
been legitimate to perceive a violation of the Club's free speech 
rights,73 the Court was ostensibly still in the process of considering 
whether the Establishment Clause justified that discrimination. Had 
the Court decided that the Establishment Clause did justify the club's 
exclusion, any perception that this prohibition signified a "hostility to- 
ward the religious viewpoint" would have been as much of a misper- 
ception as the counter-impression that the Club's presence signified 
endorsement of religion. A decision to exclude the Club would have 
resulted from concern about making nonadherents feel like outsiders in 
their school community, not from antipathy toward religion. Thus, the 
Court's implication ran afoul of the endorsement test's requirement 
that the perceptions of adherents and nonadherents be treated equally. 
Second, the Court gave an unwarrantedly narrow reading of the 
endorsement test's requirement that the perception of endorsement be 
measured not by actual individuals, but by a hypothetical reasonable 
observer. The Court argued that it would not subject the Club to a 
"heckler's veto" based on what it seemed to view as the idiosyncratic 
impressions of children. Yet the Court had previously suggested in 
dicta that the average age of the community in question can appropri- 
ately play a role in the endorsement analysis,74 and it should have 
heeded its own suggestion here. Although "[alny bystander could con- 
ceivably [have been] aware of the school's use policy,"75 the young 
schoolchildren in the district were the individuals actually attending or 
jurisprudence using a modified heckler's veto, in which a group's religious activity can be pro- 
scribed on the basis of what members of the audience might misperceive" (emphasis added)). I t  is 
true that the majority did not always refer to the potential perception of endorsement as a "mis- 
perception." Id. (stating that "[alny bystander . . . could suffer as much from viewpoint discrimi- 
nation as elementary school children could suffer from perceived endorsement," and that "[wle 
cannot operate . . . under the assumption that any risk that small children would perceive en- 
dorsement should counsel in favor of excluding the Club's religious activity"), That the majority 
used the term at all, however, indicates the conclusory perspective with which it approached the 
inquiry. 
73 See id. at 2 107 (noting that "we have already found that [the free speech] rights [of the Club 
and its members] have been violated, not merely perceived to have been violated, by the school's 
actions toward the Club"). 
74 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (O'Connor, J.) (stating that "sec- 
ondary school students are mature enough and are likely to understand that a school does not en- 
dorse or support student speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basisn); Sch. Dist. v. 
Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985) (stating that the endorsement inquiry "must be conducted with par- 
ticular care when many of the citizens perceiving the governmental message are children in their 
formative years") Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14 (1981) ("University students are, of 
course, young adults. They are less impressionable than younger students and should be able to 
appreciate that the University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion."). 
75 Good News ,  121  S. Ct. at  2106. 
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being invited to the Club's meetings, and thus their perceptions were 
critical. As such, it would have been consistent with the endorsement 
test to take into account the particular nature of the community at is- 
sue, and to adjust the prototypical "reasonable observer" appropri- 
ately.76 It is entirely logical that under the endorsement test's commu- 
nity-focused standard, the same activity could constitute an 
Establishment Clause violation in an elementary school, but not in a 
secondary school or university. 
Now that the limited public forum doctrine has largely run its 
course as a means of keeping religious activities out of public school 
facilities, the level of vigor with which the Establishment Clause is 
applied will be increasingly critical. Although the limited public fo- 
rum doctrine cannot provide a coherent rationale for the exclusion of 
religious activities from public school facilities, the endorsement test 
can provide a logical approach: rather than stepping into the shoes of 
moral philosophers, judges should instead put themselves in the shoes 
of "reasonable" students of the age in question, an inquiry that can be 
aided by various sources of objective evidence. Depending on the stu- 
dents' ages, the time and place a t  which the religious speech occurs, 
and other concrete factors, courts' approaches to the question may 
well vary from case to case." Such a fact-specific approach, however, 
represents a more intellectually coherent way of evaluating this com- 
plex issue than attempting to draw elusive distinctions between cate- 
gories of religious speech or viewing children's impressions of en- 
dorsement as mere "misperceptions" that do not pose a real danger to 
the principles underlying the Establishment Clause. 
F. Freedom of Speech and Expression 
I .  Publication of Illegally Obtained Information, - Can the media 
be punished for publishing truth? Not only has the Supreme Court 
long shied away from answering what has fairly been called media 
law's "ultimate questionlnl but it has repeatedly hinted that it never 
76 Despite the majority's suggestion, see id.,  such an adjustment does not depart from Justice 
O'Connor's statement that the hypothetical reasonable observer should be presumed aware of the 
"history and context of the community and forum in which the religious display appears." See 
Capitol Square 'Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) (O'connor, J., concur- 
ring in part and concurring in the judgment). Rather, what constitutes a "reasonable" level of 
awareness should itself be viewed as a variable factor that depends on the age of the community. 
7 7  See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that 
"[elvery government practice must be judged in its own unique circumstances to determine 
whether it constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of religion"); Spacco v. Bridgewater Sch. 
Dep't, 722  F. Supp. 834, 840 (D. Mass. 1989) (explaining that whether government conduct 
impermissibly sends a message of endorsement "depends significantly upon its context. Thus, 
each case must be determined upon its unique facts" (citation omitted)). 
Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524,532 (1989). 
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